Abstract-This paper presents a reinforcement learning algorithm and provides conditions for global convergence to Nash equilibria. For several reinforcement learning schemes, including the ones proposed here, excluding convergence to action profiles which are not Nash equilibria may not be trivial, unless the step-size sequence is appropriately tailored to the specifics of the game. In this paper, we sidestep these issues by introducing a new class of reinforcement learning schemes where the strategy of each agent is perturbed by a statedependent perturbation function. Contrary to prior work on equilibrium selection in games, where perturbation functions are globally state dependent, the perturbation function here is assumed to be local, i.e., it only depends on the strategy of each agent. We provide conditions under which the strategies of the agents will converge to an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the set of Nash equilibria almost surely. We further specialize the results to a class of potential games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lately, agent-based modeling has generated significant interest in various settings, such as engineering, social sciences and economics. In those formulations, agents make decisions independently and without knowledge of the actions or intentions of the other agents. Usually, the interactions among agents can be described in terms of a strategic-form game, and stability notions, such as the Nash equilibrium, can be utilized to describe desirable outcomes for all agents.
In this paper, we are interested in deriving conditions under which agents learn to play Nash equilibria. Assuming minimum information available to each agent, namely its own utilities and actions, we introduce a novel reinforcement learning scheme and derive conditions under which global convergence to Nash equilibria can be achieved.
Prior results in reinforcement learning has primarily focused on common-payoff games [1] . In reference [2] , a reinforcement learning scheme is introduced and convergence to the set of Nash equilibria is shown when applied to a class of potential games. However, although the analysis is based on weak-convergence arguments (due to a constant stepsize selection), an explicit characterization of the limiting invariant distribution is not provided, while the issue of non-convergence to unstable points on the boundary of the For the sake of brevity, all proofs have been omitted and can be found at http://www.control.lth.se/publications/.
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A. Rantzer is with the Department of Automatic Control, Lund University, 221 00-SE Lund, Sweden; E-mail: anders.rantzer@control.lth.se. domain has been overlooked. In fact, as pointed out in [3] , establishing non-convergence to the boundary of the probability simplex might not be trivial, since standard results of the ODE method for stochastic approximations (e.g., nonconvergence to unstable equilibria [4] ) are not applicable.
In this paper, we sidestep these issues by introducing a variation of reinforcement learning algorithms where the strategy of each agent is perturbed by a state-dependent perturbation function. Contrary to prior work on equilibrium selection, where perturbation functions are also state dependent [5] , the perturbation function here is assumed to be local, i.e., it only depends on the strategy of each agent. Due to this perturbation function, the ODE method for stochastic approximations can be applied, since boundary points of the domain cease to be stationary points of the relevant ODE. This paper extends prior work [6] of the authors, where the perturbation function was assumed constant along the domain. In particular, we provide conditions under which the strategies of the agents will converge to an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the set of Nash equilibria almost surely. We further specialize the results to a class of games which belong to the family of potential games [7] .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the necessary terminology. Section III introduces the perturbed reinforcement learning scheme with a state-based perturbation function. Section IV states some standard results for analyzing stochastic approximations. Section V characterizes the set of stationary points for both the unperturbed and the perturbed learning scheme. Section VI discusses convergence properties of the unperturbed reinforcement learning scheme, while Section VII presents conditions under which the perturbed learning scheme converges to the set of Nash equilibria. Section VIII specializes the convergence analysis to a class of potential games. Finally, Section IX presents concluding remarks.
Notation: − |x| denotes the Euclidean norm of a vector x ∈ R n . − |x| ∞ denotes the ℓ ∞ -norm of a vector x ∈ R n . − B δ (x) denotes the δ-neighborhood of a vector x ∈ R n , i.e., B δ (x) {y ∈ R n : |x − y| < δ}. − dist(x, A) denotes the distance from a point x to a set A, i.e., dist(x, A) inf y∈A |x − y| . − B δ (A) denotes the δ-neighborhood of the set A ⊂ R n , i.e., B δ (A) {x ∈ R n : dist(x, A) < δ}. − ∆(m) denotes the probability simplex of dimension m, i.e., ∆(m) {x ∈ R m :
is the projection to the probability simplex, i.e., Π ∆ [x] arg min y∈∆(m) |x − y|. − A o is the interior of A ⊂ R n , and ∂A is its boundary.
− col{α i } i∈J is the column vector with entries {α i } i∈J for some set of indexes J .
II. TERMINOLOGY
We consider the standard setup of finite strategic-form games.
1) Game: A finite strategic-form game involves a finite set of agents (or players), I {1, 2, ..., n}. Each agent i ∈ I has a finite set of available actions, A i . Let α i ∈ A i be an action of agent i, and α = (α 1 , ..., α n ) the action profile of all agents. The set A is the Cartesian product of the action spaces of all agents, i.e., A A 1 × ... × A n .
The action profile α ∈ A produces a payoff (or utility) for each agent. The utility of agent i, denoted by R i , is a function which maps the action profile α to a payoff in R. Denote R : A → R n the combination of payoffs (or payoff profile) of all agents, i.e., R(·) (R 1 (·), ..., R n (·)).
2) Strategy: Let σ ij ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that agent i selects action α i = j. Then, σ i (σ i1 , ..., σ i|Ai| ) is a probability distribution over the set of actions A i (or strategy of agent i), i.e., σ i ∈ ∆(|A i |), where |A i | denotes the cardinality of the set A i . We will also use the term strategy profile to denote the combination of strategies of all agents σ = (
is the set of strategy profiles.
Note that if σ i is a unit vector (or a vertex of ∆(|A i |)), say e j , then agent i selects an action j with probability one. Such a strategy will be called pure strategy. Likewise, a pure strategy profile is a profile of pure strategies. Denote ∆ * the set of pure strategy profiles or vertices of ∆. We will use the term mixed strategy to define a strategy that is not pure.
3) Expected payoff and Nash equilibrium: Given a strategy profile σ ∈ ∆, the expected payoff vector of each agent i, U i : ∆ → R |Ai| , can be computed by
We may think of the entry j of the expected payoff vector, denoted U ij (σ), as the payoff of agent i who is playing action j at the strategy profile σ. We denote the profile of expected payoff vectors as U (σ) = (U 1 (σ), ..., U n (σ)). Finally, let u i (σ) be the expected payoff of agent i at strategy profile
for all σ i ∈ ∆(|A i |) such that σ i = σ * i . In the special case where for all i ∈ I, σ * i is a pure strategy, σ * ∈ ∆ * is called a pure Nash equilibrium. Any Nash equilibrium which is not pure is called a mixed Nash equilibrium. Also, in case the inequality in (2) is strict, the Nash equilibrium is called a strict Nash equilibrium.
III. PERTURBED LEARNING AUTOMATA
In this section, we introduce the basic form of the learning dynamics that we will consider in the remainder of the paper. They belong to the general class of learning automata [1] .
For the remainder of the paper, we will assume: Assumption 3.1 (Strictly positive payoffs): For every i ∈ I, the utility function satisfies R i (α) > 0 for all α ∈ A. Even in the case where utilities take on negative values, we can still analyze the game by considering an equivalent one with strictly positive payoffs (cf., [8] ).
A. Modified Linear Reward-Inaction (L R−I ) scheme
We consider a reinforcement scheme which is a small modification of the original linear reward-inaction (L R−I ) scheme [9] , [10] . This modified scheme, denoted byL R−I , was introduced in [6] . Contrary to L R−I , R i (·) may take values other than {0, 1}, which increases the family of games this algorithm can be applied to.
Similarly to L R−I , the probability that agent i selects action j at time k is σ ij (k) = x ij (k), for some probability vector x i (k) which is updated according to the recursion:
(3) Here we identify actions A i with vertices of the simplex, {e 1 , e 2 , ..., e |Ai| }. For example, if agent i selects action j at time k, then α i (k) = e j . Note that by letting the step-size sequence ǫ(k) to be sufficiently small and since the payoff function R i is uniformly bounded in A, x i (k) ∈ ∆(|A i |) and the projection operator Π ∆ can be omitted.
We consider the following class of step-size sequences:
for some ν ∈ (1/2, 1]. For these values of ν, the following two conditions can easily be verified:
The selection of ν is closely related to the desired rate of convergence. Compared with prior reinforcement learning schemes, both [11] and [3] consider comparable step-size sequences.
B. Pertubed Linear Reward-Inaction Scheme (L λ R−I )
Here we consider a perturbed version of the schemeL R−I , in the same spirit with [6] , where the decision probabilities of each agent are slightly perturbed. In particular, we assume that each agent i selects action j ∈ A i with probability
for some perturbation function
where the probability vector x i is updated according to (3) . We consider the following perturbation function:
for some β ∈ (0, 1) which is close to one. In other words, an agent perturbs its strategy when the latter is close to a vertex of the probability simplex. Note that the perturbation function is continuously differentiable for some β sufficiently close to one. Furthermore, lim λ↓0 ζ i (x i , λ) = 0 uniformly in x, which establishes equivalence of the perturbed dynamics with the unperturbed dynamics as λ approaches zero. The main difference with earlier work by the same authors [6] is that here we allow for the perturbation function to also depend on agent's own strategy. Similar ideas of state dependent perturbations have been utilized for equilibrium selection in adaptive learning by [5] . The difference here is that the perturbation function is locally state dependent, i.e., it only depends on the strategy of each agent and not on the strategy profile of all agents.
We will denote this scheme byL λ R−I .
IV. BACKGROUND CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
Let Ω ∆ ∞ denote the canonical path space with an element ω being a sequence {x(0), x(1), ...}, where x(k) (x 1 (k), ..., x n (k)) ∈ ∆ is generated by the reinforcement learning process. An example of a random variable defined in Ω is the function
In several cases, we will abuse notation by simply writing x(k) or α(k) instead of ψ k (ω). Let also F be a σ-algebra of subsets in Ω and P, E be the probability and expectation operator on (Ω, F ), respectively. In the following analysis, we implicitly assume that the σ-algebra F is generated appropriately to allow computation of the probabilities or expectations of interest.
A. Exit of a sample function from a domain
It is important to have conditions under which the process ψ k (ω) = x(k), k ≥ 0, with some initial distribution, will exit an open domain G in finite time.
Proposition 4.1 (Theorem 5.1 in [12]): Suppose there exists a nonnegative function
Then the process x(k) leaves G in a finite time with probability one.
The following corollary is important in cases we would like to consider entrance of a stochastic process into the domain of attraction of an equilibrium. It is a direct consequence of Proposition 4.1. For details, see Exercise 5.1 in [12] . 
where the sequence a(k) satisfies (8) 
for all δ > 0 and some T = T (δ). Then
Corollary 4.1 implies that x(k) enters an arbitrarily small neighborhood of a set A infinitely often with probability one.
B. Convergence to mean-field dynamics
The convergence properties of the reinforcement learning schemes can be described via the ODE method for stochastic approximations. The recursion ofL λ R−I , λ ≥ 0, can be written in the following form:
where the observation sequence has been decomposed into a deterministic sequence, g λ i (x(k)), (or mean-field) and a noise sequence ξ λ i (k). The mean-field is defined as follows:
where σ iq , q ∈ A i , is defined in (6) . It is straightforward to verify that g λ i (·) is continuously differentiable. The noise sequence is defined as
Note that for λ = 0, (10) coincides withL R−I . We will denote g(x) the corresponding vector field for λ = 0.
The more compact form of (10) will also be used:
where
Proposition 4.2 (Theorem 6.6.1 in [13]): For the reinforcement schemeL
λ R−I , λ ≥ 0, the stochastic iteration (11) is such that, for almost all ω ∈ Ω, {ψ k (ω) = x(k)} converges to some invariant set of the ODĖ
Also, if A ⊂ ∆ is a locally asymptotically stable set in the sense of Lyapunov for (12) , and x(k) is in some compact set in the domain of attraction of A infinitely often with probability ≥ ρ, then P[lim k→∞ x(k) ∈ A] ≥ ρ.
V. STATIONARY POINTS
The stationary points of the mean-field dynamics are defined as the set of points x ∈ ∆ for which g λ (x) = 0. In this section, we characterize the set of stationary points for both the unperturbed (λ = 0) and the perturbed dynamics (λ > 0).
We will make the following distinction among stationary points of (12) for λ > 0, denoted S λ :
− S We will also use the notation S ∂∆ , S ∆ * S ∆ o , and S NE to denote the corresponding sets when λ = 0.
A. Stationary points of unperturbed dynamics (λ = 0)
Proposition 5.1 (Stationary points for λ = 0): A strategy profile x * is a stationary point of the ODE (12) if and only if, for every agent i ∈ I, there exists a constant c i > 0, such that for any action j ∈ A i , x * ij > 0 implies U ij (x * ) = c i . The above result is quite well known for replicator learning dynamics. In fact, notice that the corresponding mean-field of the share of strategy s in agent i when λ = 0 is:
which coincides with the corresponding shares provided by the replicator dynamics (e.g., see equation (3.3) in [14] ). Two straightforward implications of Proposition 5.1 are:
Corollary 5.1 (Pure Strategies): For λ = 0, any pure strategy profile is a stationary point of the ODE (12). Corollary 5.2 (Nash Equilibria): For λ = 0, any Nash equilibrium is a stationary point of the ODE (12).
Note that for some games not all stationary points of the ODE (12) are Nash equilibria. For example, if you consider the Typewriter Game of Table I, the pure strategy profiles which correspond to (A, B) or (B, A) are not Nash equilibria, although they are stationary points of (12 On the other hand, any stationary point in the interior of ∆ will necessarily be a Nash equilibrium as the following corollary shows.
Corollary 5.3 (Mixed Nash equilibria):
For λ = 0, any stationary point x * of the ODE (12) , such that
is a (mixed) Nash equilibrium of the game.
Note that the above corollaries do not exclude the possibility that there exist stationary points in ∂∆ without those necessarily being pure strategy profiles. For the remainder of the paper, we will only consider games which satisfy:
Property 5.1: For the unperturbed dynamics, there are no stationary points in ∂∆ other than the ones in ∆ * , i.e., S ∂∆ \S ∆ * = ∅. Moreover, there exists δ > 0 such that
In other words, we only consider games for which, the stationary points of (12), λ = 0, in the boundary of ∆ are vertices of ∆, and the stationary points in ∆ o are isolated from the boundary. Property 5.1 is not restrictive and is satisfied for most but trivial cases.
B. Stationary points of perturbed dynamics (λ > 0)
A straightforward implication of the properties of the perturbation function is the following:
Lemma 5.1 (Sensitivity of S ∆ o ): There exists β 0 ∈ (0, 1) such that S ∆ o ⊆ S λ ∆ o for any β 0 < β < 1 and any λ > 0. Vertices of ∆ cease to be equilibria for λ > 0. The following proposition provides the sensitivity of S ∆ * to small values of λ.
Lemma 5.2 (Sensitivity of S ∆ * ): For any stationary point x * ∈ S ∆ * , which corresponds to a strict Nash equilibrium and for sufficiently small λ > 0, there exists a unique continuously differentiable function ν * : R + → R |A| , such that lim λ↓0 ν * (λ) = ν * (0) = 0, and
is a stationary point of the ODE (12) . If instead x * ∈ S ∆ * is not a Nash equilibrium, then for any sufficiently small δ > 0 and λ > 0, the δ-neighborhood of x * in ∆, B δ (x * ), does not contain any stationary point of the ODE (12) .
Note that the statements of Lemma 5.2 do not depend on the selection of β. Instead, they require λ to be sufficiently small. Also, note that Lemma 5.2 does not discuss the sensitivity of Nash equilibria which are not strict. However, it is straightforward to show that vertices cannot be stationary points for λ > 0.
Let alsoS 
In other words, the stationary points of the perturbed dynamics are either the interior stationary points of the unperturbed dynamics or perturbations of pure Nash equilibria.
VI. CONVERGENCE TO BOUNDARY POINTS
Recall that, for the unperturbed dynamics, not all stationary points in ∆ * are necessarily Nash equilibria. Convergence to non-desirable stationary points, such as the ones which are not Nash equilibria, cannot be excluded when agents employ the unperturbed reinforcement schemeL R−I .
Proposition 6.1 (Convergence to boundary points): If agents employ the reinforcement schemeL R−I , the probability that the same action profile will be played for all future times is uniformly bounded away from zero over all initial conditions if R i (α) > 1 for each α ∈ A, i ∈ I.
Proposition 6.1 reveals the main issue of applying reinforcement learning schemes, which is convergence with positive probability to boundary points which are not Nash equilibrium profiles. Figure 1 shows a typical response ofL R−I in the Typewriter Game of Table I . We observe that it is possible for the process to converge to a non-Nash equilibrium profile since R i (α) > 1 for all α ∈ A and i ∈ I. Table I when ν = 0.78.
These issues, which are also pointed out in [15] , [3] , will be resolved here due to the introduction of the perturbation function inL
The convergence analysis of the perturbed dynamicsL λ R−I will be subject to the following assumption:
Assumption 7.1: For the unperturbed dynamics,L R−I , there exists a twice continuously differentiable and nonnegative function
For some δ > 0, consider the δ-neighborhood of the set of stationary points S λ , B δ (S λ ). Define also the closed set: 
Lemma 7.2 (LAS -L
λ R−I ): For any λ > 0 sufficiently small, any stationary pointx ∈S λ NE , which is a perturbation of a strict Nash equilibrium according to (14) , is a locally asymptotically stable point of the ODE (12) . 
Also, for almost all ω, the process {ψ k (ω) = x(k)} converges to some invariant set in B δ (S λ ).
VIII. SPECIALIZATION TO POTENTIAL GAMES

A. Potential games
In this section, we will specialize the convergence analysis to a class of games which belongs to the general family of potential games (cf., [7] ). In particular, we will consider games which satisfy the following property:
Example 1: (Common-payoff games) One class of games which satisfies Property 8.1 is common-payoff games, where the payoff function is the same for all players. An example of a common-payoff game is the Typewriter Game of Table I . It is straightforward to show that for this game the function f (σ) = 4σ 11 σ 21 + 2σ 11 σ 22 + 2σ 12 σ 21 + 3σ 12 σ 22 satisfies Property 8.1.
Example 2: (Congestion games) A typical congestion game consists of a set I of n players and a set P of m paths. For each player i, let the set of pure strategies A i be the set of m paths. The cost to each player i of selecting the path p depends on the number of players that are using the same path. The expected number of players using path p is χ p (σ) i∈I σ ip . Define c p = c p (χ p ) to be the cost of using path p when χ p players are using path p and let c p (χ p ) be linear on χ p . The expected utility of player i is defined as:
satisfies Property 8.1.
B. Convergence to Nash equilibria
The following proposition establishes convergence to Nash equilibria for this class of potential games. 
C. Convergence to pure Nash equilibria
In several games, convergence to mixed Nash equilibria of the unperturbed dynamics S ∆ o can be excluded. In this case, convergence to stationary points inS λ NE which are perturbations of pure Nash equilibria can be established.
Let x −i denote the distribution over action profiles of the group of agents −i. Let D i be the matrix of payoffs of agent i and D −i be the matrix of payoffs of −i. The vector of expected payoffs of agent i and −i can be expressed as
To analyze the behavior around stationary points in ∆ o , we consider the nonnegative function V (x) f max −f (x) ≥ 0, x ∈ ∆, where f max sup x∈∆ f (x). It is straightforward to verify that the Jacobian matrix of f (x) is:
Higher-order derivatives of f (x) will be zero, therefore from the extension of Taylor's Theorem (cf., Theorem 5.15 in [16] ) to multivariable functions, we have:
where 
uniformly in x ∈ B δ (x * ), for some δ > 0 sufficiently small, then P[lim k→∞ x(k) = x * ] = 0. For several games testing the conditions of Proposition 8.2 may be difficult. For example, for two players and two actions, it is straightforward to show that:
where d 
D. Example
Consider the Typewriter Game of Table I . This game exhibits two pure Nash equilibria which are strict, (A, A) and (B, B). There is also a mixed Nash equilibrium, which satisfies the conditions of Proposition 8.2 as it can be verified from (16) . Thus, the conditions of Proposition 8.3 are satisfied, and the process will converge to the stationary points inS λ NE almost surely. Figure 2 shows the solution of the ODE (12) for an initial condition which corresponds to the non-Nash action profile (B, A). The solution converges to the strict Nash equilibrium (B, B) . Note that escaping from (B, A) would not be possible if λ = 0.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented a new reinforcement learning scheme for distributed convergence to Nash equilibria. The main difference from prior schemes lies in the introduction of a perturbation function in the decision rule of each agent which depends only on its own strategy. The introduction of this perturbation function sidestepped issues regarding the behavior of the algorithm close to vertices of the simplex. In particular, we derived conditions under which the perturbed reinforcement learning scheme converges to an arbitrarily small neighborhood of the set of Nash equilibria almost surely. We further specialized the results to a class of games which belong to potential games.
